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The Doctrine of External Standards Under
Sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038
I. INTRODUCTION
Sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code
provide respectively that property transferred by a decedent dur-
ing his lifetime over which he retained a right to designate who
shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom, or
had the power at his death to shift enjoyment of the property
between beneficiaries, shall be included in his gross estate.
While the sections are broad in their application and closely
limit the control which a transferor can maintain over property
he transfers without causing it to be included in his gross estate,
they do not require that a testator must relinquish all control
over the property. The purpose of this Note is to discuss the
scope of sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038, and examine the doctrine
of external standards which allows a taxpayer to maintain par-
tial control over property he transfers yet avoid inclusion of the
property in his gross estate under these sections.
II. SCOPE OF THE SECTIONS
A. ANALYSIS OF TME SECTIONS
The two sections are very similar in purpose and effect.
Section 2036 (a) (2) provides that where a person transfers
property during his lifetime but retains the right to designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the in-
come therefrom, and dies possessed of that right,1 the property
shall be included in his gross estate. Section 2038 states that
there shall be included in a decedent's gross estate all property
transferred by the decedent "where the enjoyment thereof was
subject at the date of his death to any change through the exer-
cise of a power ... to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate . .. ."
The theories underlying the provisions are also very similar.
The rationale of section 2036 (a) (2) is that a right retained by a
decedent to control enjoyment is equivalent to retention of the
enjoyment itself; the basis underlying section 2038 is that pos-
session of a power over an interest in the property at death is
tantamount to retention of the interest itself.2 The purpose of
1. Decedent need not die possessed of the right if it exists for any
period ascertainable without reference to his death. See text accompany-
ing notes 8-11 infra.
2. ALI FED. INcoME, ESTATE Am) GIFT TAX STATuTE 99 (Tent.
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both sections is to prevent avoidance of the estate tax3 by means
of the inter vivos transfer of property over which the transferor
controls use and enjoyment.4
Both provisions are broad in application. They apply to all
transfers of property,5 and they apply irrespective of the capacity
in which the right or power is exercisable.6 It is immaterial
whether the grantor holds the power alone or in conjunction
with any other party, whether or not that party be adverse. 7
The sole determining factor is whether the right or power ex-
ists,8 and it exists even if there is only an expressed or implied
understanding at the time of the transfer that the right or
power will later be conferred. 9 Under section 2036 (a) (2) the
property is includible if the right exists during (1) the decedent's
life, or (2) any period not ascertainable without reference to his
death, or (3) any period which does not in fact end before his
death.10 Section 2038 applies to powers of which testator dies
Draft No. 9, 1954). See generally W. WARREN & S. SURREY, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND G=FT TAxATIoN 260 (1961).
3. The types of property interests includible in a decedent's gross
estate are defined by INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2033-44.
4. The primary purpose of the federal estate tax is to assess the
transfer of property at death. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAmER, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GiFT TAxEs 5 (2d ed. 1962). The levy is imposed on the
value of the decedent's gross estate at death less certain allowable de-
ductions and exemptions. The value of the assets included by reason of
§§ 2036 and 2038 thus become part of the decedent's taxable gross estate.
5. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(a) (1958) & 20.2038-1(a) (1958). These
two sections clearly are not limited to transfers in trust. NT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 674 deals with the power to control the beneficial en-
joyment of transfers in trust and income tax consequences arising
therefrom.
6. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b) (3) (1958) & 20.2038-1(a) (1958).
Both provisions encompass a right or power which is exercisable only
by will. Estate of D.L Cooper, 7 T.C. 1236 (1946).
7. Estate of DuCharme v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 959 (6th Cir.
1947); Biscoe v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1957). See
Lowndes, Tax Consequences of Limitations Upon the Exercise of Powers,
1966 DUKE L.J. 959, 991.
8. Biscoe v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1957). A
power might even be within § 2036 if it exists subject to a contingency
which has not taken place at decedent's death. See text accompanying
notes 21-36 infra. In any case it is immaterial whether or not the power
is exercised.
9. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (a) (ii) (1958). There are limits to this
extension. In Estate of Burr v. Commissioner, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1054, 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1189 (1945), the tax court rejected the
argument that decedent's ownership of notes of a corporation gave him
control over dividends and hence a right to designate who could pos-
sess or enjoy the stock.
10. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1958).
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possessed and to powers which testator relinquished in contem-
plation of death."
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SECTIONS
There is considerable overlapping between sections 2036(a)
(2) and 2038. This gives rise to problems where both provisions
apply to the same transfer, because the two sections may re-
quire different amounts to be included in the transferor's
gross estate. If a decedent transfers property during his life-
time but retains a right with respect to that property falling
within the scope of section 2036(a), the value of the entire prop-
erty is includible in the decedent's estate. This figure may be
decreased, however, by an amount which is equal to any out-
standing income interests not subject to decedent's control
which are actually being enjoyed by other persons at decedent's
death.' 2 Furthermore, if the decedent retained a right with re-
spect to only a part of the property, only that part is in-
cludible under section 2036.13 On the other hand, taxability
under 2038 is limited to those interests the enjoyment of which
may actually be modified by the decedent at the time of his
death through the exercise of the power. All other interests are
not includible.
To illustrate the foregoing assume that A creates a trust to
pay the income to B for life, remainder to C or his estate. A
retains the power to accumulate income and add it to corpus.
Under section 2036 the entire property would be included in A's
gross estate because he may designate who shall receive its in-
come. If A retains power to accumulate only half of the income,
then only half of the entire property, corpus plus income, is
includible. Under section 2038 only the value of B's income in-
terest is includible because A retains only the power to modify
income.' 4
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038(a) (1).
12. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (ii) (1958).
13. Id.
14. In addition to the discrepancy between the amounts includi-
ble under each section, there was some early controversy over the
amount includible under § 2036. Commissioner v. Estate of McDermott,
222 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1955), held that where the grantor retained the
power to distribute or to add trust income to principal, accumulations
of income on the assets transferred were not includible in the gross
estate. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966), overruled
McDermott, however, holding that both the trust property and the ac-
cumulated income from the trust were includible in the gross estate.
10731968]
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C. LIMITATIONS ON APPLICATION
While sections 2036 and 2038 are broad in scope, several
limitations circumscribe their application. Both because of the
possible differences in amounts includible under the two sections
and because exclusion from each is paramount in estate planning,
an examination of these limitations is important.
1. Retained Powers
Section 2036 refers to rights or powers "retained" at the time
of the transfer of the interest,13 while section 2038 applies to
powers "without regard to when or from what source the dece-
dent acquired such power."'16 Thus, if a testator does not re-
tain a proscribed power at the time he transfers the property,
but acquires one thereafter, the property will be included in his
gross estate only if section 2038 applies. Only limited use can be
made of this fact, however, since a right is treated as re-
tained if there was an understanding, expressed or implied, at
the time of the transfer, that the interest or right would later
be conferred.'7 Inclusion will also result if a right can be
exercised indirectly'8 through the medium of another person or
entity subject to the decedent's control.19
2. Transfers in Contemplation of Death
Section 2038 provides specifically that if a power, taxable
under that section, is released in contemplation of death, the
interest subject to the power is includible thereunder. But sec-
tion 2036 contains no counterpart to this provision.2 0 It would
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036 (a).
16. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2038 (a) (1). The fact that § 2038 is
not restricted to cases in which a decedent expressly reserves a power
is sometimes crucial. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 683, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 603,
where it was held that contributions made by a decedent to a trust cre-
ated by his wife were includible under § 2038 because his consent was
required to revoke or modify the trust.
17. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1958).
18. Rev. Rul. 67, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 269, states that where decedent
makes an inter vivos transfer of nonvoting stock in trust for the benefit
of his children, retaining all of the voting stock until his death, and (1)
either remains as trustee until his death, or (2) places restrictions on
the trustee's power to dispose of the nonvoting stock, this indirect re-
tention of the right to designate enjoyment requires inclusion under
§ 2036.
19. 3 J. MERTENs, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GiFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 24.28 (1959).
20. Section 2036 (a) (2) does expressly include property where the
right to designate is retained for a period not ascertainable without
1074 [Vol. 52:1071
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appear, therefore, that a testator could avoid inclusion under
section 2036 by giving away his taxable right immediately before
death. However, two cases and a Revenue Ruling arising under
the 1939 Code's predecessor of section 2036,21 and the current
Treasury regulations indicate that a release of a section 2036
right in contemplation of death may result in inclusion.22 Nev-
ertheless, since the Revenue Ruling and the cases arose under the
1939 Code, it is possible that the courts will not find section
2036 applicable to transfers of control in contemplation of death.
23
3. Control over Income-Producing Property
Because section 2036 uses the phrase "possess or enjoy the
property," it would appear to include as taxable a right to control
the disposition of trust principal as well as income. However,
its scope is actually limited to the right to designate who shall
receive income from the property, or to possess or enjoy the
property itself only if it is nonincome-producing property.
24
reference to decedent's death. But this is not identical in application
to the contemplation provision of § 2038.
21. Rev. Rul. 324, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 999, held that relinquishment
by decedent in contemplation of death of a right to designate who shall
possess or enjoy property will render the property includible in the
decedent's gross estate. In both Studebaker v. United States, 211 F.
Supp. 263 (N.D. Ind. 1962), and Estate of Wardwell, 37 T.C. 1187 (1961),
the § 2036 interests which had been released within three years of de-
cedent's death were held not includible. In each case, however, the
court applied the § 2035 contemplation of death provision, but ex-
cluded the property on the grounds that the presumption created under
§ 2035 had been overcome.
The literal language of § 2036(a) would seem to impose a tax
even if decedent relinquishes his rights not in contemplation of death
for, unlike § 2038, it does not explicitly require that the right continue
until the grantor's death or be released on contemplation of death.
Section 2036 could even be read to require that once a right is re-
tained, that right cannot be excluded from testator's gross estate. This
phenomenon is sometimes characterized as the "scotch tape theory,"
and finds support in the concurring opinion in United States v. Allen,
293 F.2d 916, 918 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961). There
is authority, however, that § 2036 will not extend this far. See, e.g.,
Estate of Cuddihy, 32 T.C. 1171 (1959).
22. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(b) (1958).
23. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(b) (1958) mentions §§ 2036, 2037, 2038,
and 2041, while § 2035 refers specifically only to §§ 2038 and 2041.
See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035. By implication this would seem to
support the thesis that § 2036 does not encompass transfers in contem-
plation of death.
24. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3) (1958). See H.R. REP. No. 12,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). See also J. Lnwrs, THE ESTATE TAX 60-61
(1960); Gray & Covey, State Street-A Case Study of Sections 2036
(a) (2) and 2038, 15 TAx L. Rsv. 75, 79 (1959).
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Thus, if the testator transfers property to X for life, remainder
to Y, and retains only the power to change the remainderman,
the trust property will not be includible under section 2036.25
4. Contingent Powers
If the grantor retains a power contingent on an event beyond
his control which has not taken place before his death, section
2036 (a) (2) will apply, but section 2038 will not.26 Treasury
regulations provide specifically that section 2038 is not applicable
"to a power the exercise of which was subject to a contingency
beyond the decedent's control which did not occur before his
death .... -27 The regulations illustrate this principle by ref-
erence to a power the exercise of which is contingent upon
the death of another person during decedent's life.28  In addi-
tion, the following powers have been found not taxable because
of the contingency concept: Where a trustee was given discre-
tion to transfer any part of the principal from one beneficiary
to another after the youngest beneficiary reached the age of
thirty, the res was not included in the trustee's estate when he
died before the youngest beneficiary attained the prescribed
age. 29 Also, the res was not included when a decedent could
obtain the power to defer distribution of corpus only if he sur-
25. Some courts have not so limited § 2036, however. See, e.g.,
Bailey v. Ratterre, 144 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.N.Y. 1956), affd, 243 F.2d 454
(2d Cir. 1957).
26. Compare Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-l(b) (1958), with Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2036-1(b) (3) (iii) (1958).
27. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(b) (1958). A power dependent on a
contingency must be distinguished from two other types of dependent
powers: a power conditional on precedent notice by testator, and a
power which is effective only after a stated period. Section 2038 pro-
vides that any power thereunder shall be considered to exist on the date
of the decedent's death even though the exercise of the power is sub-
ject to a precedent giving of notice, or even though the exercise of such
power takes effect only on the expiration of a stated period after the
exercise of the power, whether or not on or before the date of the
decedent's death notice had been given or the power had been exer-
cised. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038(b). See generally C. LowNDEs
& R. KRnmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 9.11 (1956). Courts
have applied this provision not only to powers which are exercisable
only after a precedent notice of a given period, but also to powers which
become effective after the lapse of such a given period. Mellon v. Dris-
coil, 117 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 579 (1941). Powers
which are exercisable only during limited but regularly recurring
periods are also includible. Rundle v. Welch, 184 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.
Ohio 1960).
28. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(b) (1958).
29. Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949).
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vived his wife but failed to do so. 30 In a similar case the power
to revoke was in decedent's wife, having been previously relin-
quished by him with the proviso that he would regain the power
should he survive his wife. The res was not included in de-
cedent's gross estate when decedent failed to survive his spouse.,,
Finally, where a decedent held a power to appoint a new trustee
only on resignation of the current trustee, the res was not in-
cluded since the trustee never resigned.3 2
Although the regulations apply the contingency concept
only to section 2038, it is possible that the courts will disagree
in the future with the Treasury's contention that contingent pow-
ers are taxable under section 2036 (a) (2). While most of the
cases holding contingent powers not taxable arose under the
predecessor of section 2038 in the 1939 Code,33 there are cases
which held that a contingent power was not taxable under the
predecessors of either section 2036 (a) (2) or 2038.34 The differ-
ences in wording between the sections35 would not seem to be a
sufficient basis for distinguishing the sections.3 6 Furthermore,
30. Estate of Ballard, 47 B.T.A. 784 (1942), afid, 138 F.2d 512
(2d Cir. 1943).
31. Estate of Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944).
32. Rev. Rul. 393, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 448.
33. See generally C. LoWvnEs & R. KAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAxEs § 9.11 (1956).
34. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Estate of Kasch,
30 T.C. 102 (1958).
35. The language in § 2038 referring to a power "at the date of
[decedent's] death" seemingly lends itself to the contingency concept
more naturally than does the phraseology in § 2036 that a right "re-
tained for [decedent's] life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end be-
fore his death .... " Nevertheless, in a situation where the contingency
concept is applicable, the right or power was never exercisable. Thus
when viewed in retrospect at the time of death, there never was a right
or power of value to the decedent. Consequently, the contingency
concept would appear equally applicable to both §§ 2036 and 2038.
36. Lowndes, supra note 7, at 991, offers two possible grounds for
distinguishing between the sections on this question: (1) Section 2038
(b) expressly provides that notice or lapse of time before the power
can be exercised will not prevent inclusion of the property subject to
the power. It may be argued that by expressly including powers
subject to certain contingencies, Congress intended to exclude all other
contingent powers. Since § 2036 contains no mention of contingencies at
all, this reasoning is not possible under that section. (2) Section 2036
(a) (2) does not by its terms tax the existence of the power to desig-
nate who enjoys the property; rather, it taxes the transfer of the
property with retention of the power.
The second ground for distinguishing between the sections goes too
far. The result of this would mean that once the testator has retained
a § 2036 (a) (2) power, he could never elude the tax on such a right.
1968] 1077
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Estate of Kasch3 7 held that where the powers held by the grantor
were subject to the occurrence of an event which had not taken
place at grantor's death, the power did not make the property
includible under either section 2038 or section 2036 (a) (2). With
this broader application of the contingency concept, the estate
planner can make good use of the concept in giving to his
grantor-client powers he would like to retain for exercise only
after the happening of specific events.3 8
III. THE DOCTRINE OF EXTERNAL STANDARDS
While retained powers, contingent powers, and powers re-
linquished in contemplation of death somewhat restrict the ap-
plication of sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038, they are of limited
value to the estate planner. Although powers acquired subse-
quent to the transfer of testator's property are not includible
under section 2036, they are includible under section 2038. Pow-
ers subject to a contingency are excludible only until the con-
tingent event has taken place, and may even be included prior
to that time under section 2036. While powers relinquished in
contemplation of death may not be included under section 2036,
they will certainly be included under section 2038. A combina-
tion of these powers may be helpful in protecting property trans-
ferred from taxation, but their confined use must be recognized.
There is, however, a further restriction to the application of the
relevant provisions which may save a power otherwise taxable
thereunder: the doctrine of external standards.
The doctrine of external standards states that where a grant-
or's powers to designate enjoyment of property interests or to
See United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916, 918 (10th Cir.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961). While advancing these two
grounds, Lowndes himself states that the distinctions are "exceedingly
tenuous." Lowndes, supra note 7, at 992.
37. 30 T.C. 102 (1958).
38. The following are two examples utilizing the contingency con-
cept: (1) Grantor wishes his wife to be trustee of the trust into
which he transfers property for his children. But if his wife dies, he
would like to regain control of the property. A retained power exer-
cisable "only in event of my wife's death" will accomplish this, yet
insure exclusion of the property so long as grantor dies before his wife.(2) Grantor would like to retain power to pay from the trust
corpus to his daughter only if the husband should die or divorce her,
thus leaving her without support. A transfer by grantor retaining such a
power only "in event that my daughter should be divorced, or her hus-
band should die or become incapacitated" will give the grantor the de-
sired power without inclusion so long as the contingent event has not
taken place.
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modify 9 such interests are ministerial or controlled by a stand-
ard, and thus are duties enforceable in a court of equity, the
property so transferred is not includible in the grantor's gross es-
tate when he dies.40 The reasoning supporting the doctrine is
entirely consistent with the policy underlying sections 2036 and
2038. The rationale previously stated for these sections is that
since retention of powers over the interest transferred is equiva-
lent to retention of the interest itself, they should be taxed as
such. If, however, such powers over the interest are not freely
exercisable by the transferor but are in effect limited minister-
ial duties enforceable in an equity court, such powers are not
equivalent to holding the interest itself and should not require
inclusion of the property in the transferor's estate at death.41
This doctrine can be quite valuable to the estate planner.
It will allow the testator-client to retain a certain degree of
control over property he transfers, yet exclude the property from
his taxable gross estate. It is more useful than the contingency
concept for, unlike that concept, it unquestionably applies to both
sections 2036 (a) (2) and 2038 and it does not lose its excludible
effect upon the occurrence of some future contingent event.42
It may of course be desirable to apply both the external stand-
ards doctrine and the contingency concept to a single transfer to
insure exclusion of the property,43 but this is not always con-
39. The word "modify" is used here to mean the power to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate under § 2038.
40. See 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 19, § 24.30.
41. See Gray & Covey, supra note 24, at 86. See generally 3 J.
MERTENS, supra note 19, § 24.30. Other ways in which the principle has
been expressed include: (1) the discretion in trustees to make distri-
butions of trust properties according to specified and determinable
standards is merely ministerial and does not constitute either the right
to designate who shall possess or enjoy or the power to terminate the
trust, Estate of Wier, 17 T.C. 409 (1951); (2) that the right is given in
the instrument of transfer and can be enforced by the beneficiary when
the need arises and, hence, no discretion is left to the decedent; there-
fore, there is no "power" to change enjoyment or to modify, Estate of
Budiong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946). Accord, Industrial Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 165 F.2d 142 (Ist Cir. 1947). See 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 19,§ 25.31.
42. Ironically, Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947), dis-
cussed infra note 44 and accompanying text, is the leading case for both
the contingency concept and the external standard doctrine. As in
that case, the concepts are often hard to distinguish when applied to
certain invasion powers. For example, a power to invade in case of
"emergency" could be considered as limited by both the contingency
concept and the external standard doctrine.
43. While the contingency concept and the external standards
doctrine are both ways to exclude property subject to certain restricted
powers, the two concepts differ in theory and application. The theory
19681 1079
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sistent with testator's wishes. However, so long as a "sufficient"
standard controls testator's power over the transferred property,
the doctrine will itself insulate such property from estate taxa-
tion.
A. ESTABLISmamT OF T DOCTRmE
The external standards doctrine is entirely a judicial crea-
tion. In the leading case of Jennings v. Smith44 the trustees, of
whom the deceased settlor was one, were empowered to invade
the trust corpus if the beneficiaries "should suffer prolonged ill-
ness or be overtaken by financial misfortune which the trustees
deem extraordinary." The Commissioner contended that these
discretionary powers to pay income and principal were taxable
under sections 2036 (a) (2) and 2038. The court held that since
the trustees were not free to exercise untrammeled discretion,
but were to be governed by detern-Aable standards and thus
controlled by the courts, the sections did not apply.45
In a subsequent case, Estate of Wier,40 the grantor created
individual trusts for his two daughlers, and gave the trustees
behind the contingency concept is that the relevant sections apply
only when the power is actually exercisable. Hence, if exercise of the
power is subject to a contingency which has not occurred at decedent's
death, the power has not "vested" in the decedent and should not be
included in his gross estate. The theory of the external standard doc-
trine is somewhat different. A power which is sufficiently limited and
capable of determination by a court of equity, whether or not it is
presently exercisable, is not the type of power which should require
inclusion. This dissimilarity in theory between the two concepts also
leads to a difference in application. When applying the contingency
concept, one looks only to see if the contingent event has happened; if
it has, the property will be included. On the other hand, when applying
the external standard doctrine the controlling factor is whether the
standard sufficiently limits the trustee's discretion so as to prevent free
exercise of the power. Thus while the contingency concept applies only
before the prescribed event, for example, "in event of sickness," the
external standard concept, if it is sufficiently limited, also applies after
such "event." See generally 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 19, § 25.31.
44. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947). The doctrine was first enunciated
in Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
45. The court stated that "a 'right' so qualified that it becomes a
duty enforceable in a court of equity on petition by the beneficiaries
does not circumvent the obvious purpose of § [2036]." 161 F.2d at 78.
While Jennings applied to powers to pay income and principal, it has
been accepted as standing for the external standard concept generally,
which includes many other types of management powers. See, e.g.,
State St. Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959)
(various management powers); Estate of Wilson v. Commissioner, 13
T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951) (control over in-
vestments).
46. 17 T.C. 409 (1951).
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power to expend first out of income, then out of corpus "as they
may deem necessary or proper for the support, maintenance
and education of our said daughter .... ,47 The grantor re-
tained the power to remove any or all trustees and appoint suc-
cessors. 4 8 The Wier court likened this standard to that in Jen-
nings, holding that the powers of the trustees were governed by
a sufficient standard and enforceable in a court of equity, and
hence the property was not includible in the grantor's estate.
The doctrine as established in the Jennings and Wier cases
has had broad subsequent application. It has recently been ap-
plied to a wide array of retained management and administrative
powers in addition to the invasion powers present in Jennings
and Wier. In both the management power and invasion power
areas, the doctrine has great value to the estate planner, be-
cause it allows the testator to retain a certain degree of influ-
ence over property he transfers without incurring a tax thereon.
For this reason, consideration will be given to the application of
the external standards doctrine with regard to both retained
powers of invasion and retained management powers.
B. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO POWERS OF INVASION
The external standards doctrine has often been used to ex-
clude from taxation property subject to testator's power of inva-
sion. For example, when transferring property to his children
testator frequently wishes to be able to invade corpus for the
benefit of the children in certain circumstances such as "in case
of illness" or "in case of emergency." If such a power is suffi-
ciently limited, the external standards doctrine will insulate
the property subject to the power from estate taxation. The
problem, of course, is to determine just what limitation must be
placed upon the invasion power to accomplish this favorable
tax result. The cases are by no means clear on this point. For
instance, a provision that grantor may invade corpus for the
"best interest of the beneficiary" has been held to be a sufficient
standard in some cases, but not in others.49 Nevertheless, it will
47. Id. at 413.
48. Generally, an unrestricted power to remove a trustee and re-
place him is considered to be a taxable power. Walter v. United States,
341 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1965). But see United States v. Winchell, 289 F.2d
212 (9th Cir. 1961), where decedent's retained power to appoint a suc-
cessor to a resigning trustee did not result in inclusion.
49. Compare Hays' Estate v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cir.
1950), with Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949), and Lober v. United
States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953), and Biscoe v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 224
(D. Mass. 1957).
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be helpful to consider, first, the reasons why given standards
have not been found sufficient to require exclusion, and second,
the various limitations to invasion powers which have been held
to be sufficient standards.
1. Attributes of a "Sufficient Standard" Governing Powers of
Invasion
There are a number of attributes which a standard must have
in order to insure exclusion of property over which testator
maintains a power. First, the standard must be enforceable in
the state equity court.50 This factor is basic, since the external
standards doctrine rests on the proposition that testator's powers
are actually duties enforceable in such a state court. This does
not mean, however, that the state court has the final word as to
the sufficiency of a standard; the issue of sufficiency is a fed-
eral question which can be decided only by a federal court.r'
A second requirement of a sufficient external standard is
that it be expressed in the instrument itself. It cannot be sup-
plied by the external circumstances . 2 It is the power actually
given to the testator that governs, not the likelihood of its use
as shown by extrinsic circumstances. 3 Consequently, where the
executor argued that the testator's power was limited because
under the circumstances it was inconceivable that he would do
50. See United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962)
(dicta); Estate of Frew v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1240 (1947).
51. Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1960). See A. CASNE1, ESTATE PLANMG 196, n.96 (3d ed. 1961). While
the ultimate determination of a standard is a federal question, it would
seem that a federal court would be bound to hold a standard insuf-
ficient to exclude an interest if the state court had refused to enforce
the interest. This reasoning is supported. by the fact that the premise
of the external standard is that the standard under consideration is en-
forceable in the state equity court. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
recently held in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967),
that where a federal estate tax is imposed on a state defined property
interest, the state trial court's determination of the interest is not
binding on the federal courts. While the Bosch case arose in a different
estate tax context than the problem being considered in this Note, the
holding of the case would seem applicable. Even if a federal court is
not bound by a state court's negative determination as to the enforce-
ability of a given standard, however, such a holding should have great
weight in the federal determination.
52. A few cases have held that a standard is sufficient if it is
imposed by state law, though such a standard was not incorporated in
the trust instrument itself. See, e.g., Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
However, as stated in note 51 supra and accompanying text, the state
determination is not binding on the federal court and may not be re-
lied on as establishing a standard sufficient for exclusion.
53. Biscoe v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 244, 226 (D. Mass. 1957).
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anything but allow the property to go to his son, the court held
the property includible.
54
Third, the standard must place reasonable limits upon the
testator's power; it must circumscribe testator's power in such a
way that it is confined within allowable limits of discretion.
Thus, powers left to the testator and other trustees to be exer-
cised "if in their opinion the circumstances require"5 5 have been
held to be includible. Similarly, powers to invade "as [the
trustees] may consider suitable and necessary in the interests
and for the welfare of the beneficiary" have been held insuffi-
cient to exclude the property.56
A fourth criteria is that the standard must be objectively
determinable. The determinable requirement is intended to
serve two purposes: it insures that testator will have well de-
fined bounds within which he can exercise his discretion and it
enables the state courts to determine when testator's power
may be enforceable and when it may not. A number of cases
have included property subject to a power with an inadequately
determinable standard. Grantor-trustee's powers exercisable "as
in [his] judgment [he] shall deem best" 57 was held includible, as
was testator's right to invade as he "may deem necessary or
desirable having in mind my wife's greatest comfort and happi-
ness."5 " While there are cases which have excluded property
subject to loosely drawn standards such as power to invade
"for any good reason,"5' 9 little reliance should be put upon such
cases in drafting a determinable standard.
54. Id. at 225. In O'Malley v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 30 (N.D.
Ill. 1963), the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the required
external standard was imposed generally by the law of Illinois. A
similar argument was made and rejected in Estate of Varian, 47 T.C. 34
(1966).
55. Hurd v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1947).
56. Estate of Nettleton, 4 T.C. 987 (1945). There the court stated
that "[ijn view of the wide range given to decedent, as trustee, to
invade corpus, it would be difficult to place any reasonable bounds
upon the possibility of his power. . . ." Id. at 993.
57. Estate of Driscoll, 50 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Pa. 1943), affd, 137
F.2d 653 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1944).
58. Estate of Markson, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 309 (1944). See
also Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949):
We can not regard the language involved as limiting the usual
scope of a trustee's discretion. It must always be anticipated
that trustees will act for the best interests of a trust beneficiary,
and an exhortation to act 'in the interests and for the welfare'
of the beneficiary does not establish an external standard.
Id. at 1170.
59. Estate of Wilson, 13 T.C. 869, aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 145
(3d Cir. 1951).
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A fifth requirement is that the standard, as expressed in
the instrument, must be specific. However, courts are not in
agreement as to the degree of specificity required. While one
case held the power to invade in case of "a special emergency"
to be specific enough for exclusion," another found that this
was not a specific enough standard.6 1 Nevertheless, the planner
must be cognizant of the fact that courts have on occasion used
the "specific" requirement as a basis for holding a given stand-
ard insufficient to allow exclusion.
While none of the above criteria have been deemed solely
determinative in applying the external standards doctrine to a
given power of invasion, they have all influenced the courts
to various degrees in taxing retained invasion powers. The es-
tate planner thus should note these factors when he drafts an
instrument retaining transferor powers. In addition, it may be
helpful for him to examine standards which the courts have
held to be sufficient to exclude otherwise taxable invasion pow-
ers.
2. Standards Held Sufficient To Govern Invasion Powers
The following standards have been held adequate to exclude
invasion powers retained by the testator: powers to invade in
case of "prolonged illness" or financial misfortune which the
trustees deem extraordinary,62 where income is "insufficient for
the proper maintenance and support of the beneficiary," 63 "mis-
fortune,"64 when it is necessary for the beneficiary's "mainte-
nance, welfare, comfort or happiness, '65 or for his "support, main-
tenance and education."6 6 One court has gone so far as to hold
that the power to invade for "educational purposes or because of
illness or for any other good reason" is excludible6 7 Two cases
have, without explanation, held the following standards suffi-
cient for exclusion under section 2038, but not under section
2036 (a) (2): "sickness or other emergency"68 and "for her proper
60. Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
61. Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1960),
aff'g 137 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
62. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
63. Estate of Frew, 8 T.C. 1240 (1947).
64. Estate of Toeller, 6 T.C. 832 (1946), alf-d, 165 F.2d 665 (7th
Cir. 1948).
65. United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962).
66. Estate of Wier, 17 T.C. 409 (1951).
67. Estate of Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d
145 (3d Cir. 1951).
68. Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
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maintenance, education and support, to purchase or build or
furnish a home, allow her to engage in travel or enter a pro-
fession or commence a business."69
It is obvious from the preceding discussion and a comparison
with cases holding standards inadequate that the external stand-
ards doctrine has not been applied with much consistency.
However, if the drafter keeps in mind the reasons why courts
have found given standards insufficient and uses the "success-
ful" standards as a basis for drafting, he can successfully re-
serve for his client-grantor a certain amount of invasion power
and still insulate the property transferred from inclusion within
the grantor's gross estate.
C. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTmnE TO MANAGEMENT POWERS
If powers of the grantor to manage the transferred prop-
erty are held in a sufficiently limited fiduciary capacity, with
ascertainable and enforceable duties owed to the beneficiaries,
then the value of the property transferred is not includible in
the decedent's gross estate. The powers retained by the grantor
must be sufficiently limited.7 0 Unrestricted general manage-
ment powers held by a testator in a fiduciary capacity cause the
property thereunder to be included.71 Thus, the courts face
the difficult task of determining when a power is restricted
enough to come within the spirit of the external standards doc-
trine as it applies to management powers.
For many years courts allowed exclusion of property subject
to numerous management powers. 2 Then, in 1959, State Street
69. Estate of Deaktor, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 992 (1966).
70. A similar rationale underlies the nontaxability of powers
sufficiently limited by external standards, and "trivial powers" re-
tained by a grantor. The two concepts are distinguishable, however:
the former is excluded because no matter how potentially broad the
power is, it is sufficiently limited in this case by a standard. The
trivial power, on the other hand, is excluded because it is not significant
enough to require taxation. Federal taxing statutes do not concern
themselves with trivialities. Dort v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir.
1934). See generally 3 J. METENs, supra note 19, § 25.09.
71. Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949); Estate of Budlong, 7
T.C. 756 (1946). Accord, Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d
142 (1st Cir. 1947). See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3) (1958).
72. For example, investment powers held in a fudiciary capacity
almost never required inclusion. Estate of Resch, 20 T.C. 171 (1953);
Estate of Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949); Estate of Neal, 8 T.C. 237 (1947);
Estate of O'Neal, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 713, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 591(1947); Estate of Hall, 6 T.C. 933 (1946); Estate of Downe, 2 T.C. 967(1943). Also, limited powers to allocate receipts held in a fiduciary
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Trust Company v. United States73 seemingly reversed this trend.
There, the decedent, as co-trustee of three irrevocable trusts
established for the benefit of his children, had the powers to
invest and reinvest property without restriction, and to allocate
receipts to either income or principl.7 4 The trustees were to be
liable only for their own willful acts and defaults. The court
held that the trust property was includible, reasoning that the
wide array of discretionary administrative powers of the trus-
tees were so broad that, within any limits a state court of
equity could impose, the trustees could affect the interests of
the life tenants and remaindermen.7 5 The case, broad in its
application and wording, was a definite setback in the use of
limited management and administrative powers retained by a
testator over property he transfers. It has received consider-
able criticism from many writers76 and the American Bar As-
capacity were not included. Goyette v. United States, 57-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 58, 714 (S.D. Cal. 1957); Estate of Fiske, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 42,
15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 42 (1946). See generally Covey, Section 2036-The
New Problem Child of the Federal Estate Tax, 4 TAx COUNSEL Q. 121,
151 (1960); Gray & Covey, supra note 24, at 83.
73. 160 F. Supp. 877 (D. Mass. 1958), aff'd, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir.
1959).
74. The decedent also had the power to invade and distribute to a
child from principal as the trustees "may deem necessary or desirable"
for the child's "comfort, maintenance and/or support." 160 F. Supp. at
880. The court followed the Jennings case as to this power, however,
holding that this invasion power did not require inclusion in the gross
estate because the standard set forth created enforceable rights in the
beneficiary. Id. at 880.
75. Perhaps no single power conferred by the decedent on the
trustees would be enough to warrant inclusion of the corpora
of the trusts in his estate. But we believe that the powers
conferred on the trustees, considered as a whole, are so broad
and all inclusive that within any limits a Massachusetts court
of equity could rationally impose, the trustees, within the
scope of their discretionary powers, could very substantially
shift the economic benefits of the Lrusts between the life ten-
ants and the remaindermen.
State St. Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635, 639 (1st Cir. 1959).
The first sentence quoted herein is subject to criticism: If no one
of the powers standing alone would require inclusion, why should a
combination of such powers do so? Or, as one writer has said,
"[A] doption [of such a proposition] would create a chaotic situation in
dealing with the taxability of management powers since each case
would be a law unto itself." Covey, supra note 72, at 153.
76. Cantwell, Tax-Wise Drafting of Fudiciary Powers, 98 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 972 (1959); Covey, supra note 72; Gray & Covey, supra note 24;
Kramer, Annual Survey of American Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 177 (1960);
Pedrick, Grantor Powers and Estate Taxation: The Ties That Bind, 54
Nw. U.L. REv. 527, 554-59 (1959); Smith, Dominion and Control in the
Taxation of Trusts, 37 TAxEs 1074 (1959); Stevens, State Street Decision
Makes Urgent Review of Powers of Settlor-Trustee, 11 J. TmxATioN 172
(1959).
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sociation.77
State Street can be considered the low water mark in the
application of the doctrine of external standards to management
and administrative powers. Subsequently, the Tax Court has
described the facts of the case as "unusual," the powers therein
as "extraordinary," and the rule thereunder as "exceptional."78
In addition, the trend of cases has been toward a more extensive
application of the doctrine to management powers. The most
significant of these cases to date is Estate of Wurts,79 where
property was transferred in trust with a wide combination of
management powers retained by decedent.80 The court specifi-
cally refused to follow State Street and held that the trust was
not includible, stating that the power to pay principal to the
income beneficiary was limited by a determinable standard and
that the discretionary powers held by the trustee were adminis-
trative in nature, trivial in amount, and enforceable by a bene-
ficiary in a court of equity.81 While the Wurts court considered
State Street distinguishable as to the powers retained by de-
cedent, a close reading of the cases makes them difficult to recon-
cile. The testator-trustee in Wurts retained the power to (1)
invest in income or nonincome-producing assets, (2) retain any
investment or hold any part of the trust property uninvested,
(3) charge trust expenses against income or principal, (4) allo-
cate extraordinary cash dividends or any dividends payable in
or any rights to subscribe to the stock of a corporation other
than the issuing corporation to income or principal, and (5) do
all acts which persons owning the property individually might
77. See ABA PROGRAM OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION 59 (1959).
78. Estate of Peters, 42 T.C. 1155 (1964).
79. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 544, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 610 (1960).
80. By retaining a right to appoint himself trustee at any time,
the testator retained the powers given to the trustee. These powers are
enumerated in the text accompanying note 82 infra.
81. The court stated that
the rights of the respective beneficiaries in the Wurts trust
were fixed and were ascertainable. Any determinations com-
mitted to the sole discretion of the trustee were administra-
tive in nature and trivial in amount. A right of a beneficiary
so qualified that it becomes a duty enforceable in a court of
equity on petition by the beneficiary does not circumvent the
obvious purpose of section [2036(a)(2)] to prevent transfers
akin to testamentary dispositions from escaping taxation ....
The administrative powers in the Wurts trust were not so broad
that we may conclude that the grantor ... had the power mate-
rially to vary the enjoyment of the interests as between the
beneficiaries.
19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 544, 551, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 610, 617 (1960)
(emphasis added).
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do.82 These seem no less extensive than the powers retained
in State Street to (1) invest and reinvest in securities or other
properties of a kind or amount not ordinarily considered suit-
able for a trust investment, (2) determine what shall be
charged or credited to income and what to principal, including
the right to so determine in regard to stock and cash dividends
and other receipts, and to make deductions for depreciation,
amortization, or waste, and (3) do all things which the testator
could do individually.
Subsequent cases have further mitigated the seemingly
rigorous result in State Street. In Estate of Peters83 the grantor
retained as co-trustee very broad management and investment
powers, including power to buy or sell any property or invest-
ment in her "absolute discretion," to exercise stock conversion
and voting rights, to determine income and principal, to com-
promise tax claims, and to give binding determination of prop-
erty values for purposes of distributing property among bene-
ficiaries. The Commissioner argued that such retained powers
were so sweeping that they gave the grantor the ability to shift
possession or enjoyment among beneficiaries and hence should
be includible. The court held for the taxpayer, however, stat-
ing that while the management powers reserved by decedent
were "broad indeed, [they] were not such as to bring into play
the exceptional rule of the State Street case. .... ,,84
In Estate of King,85 the external standards doctrine was ex-
tended to trust-advisor powers.8 6 In King the grantor gave the
trustees broad powers of management and investment, exer-
cisable solely at decedent's direction, including the right to in-
vest in any type of property, even though speculative, extra-
hazardous, and unproductive. The court found the grantor had in
effect made himself a fiduciary and that, under New York law,
he was not at liberty to administer the trust for his own benefit
or to ignore the rights of the beneficiaries. Hence it was held
that the interest in question was not includible. The court dis-
tinguished State Street on the grounds that there, in addition to
broad investment powers, the settlor as trustee had the unlimited
power to allocate as between income and corpus and the power
to deduct from the income for depreciation, amortization, and
82. Id.
83. 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1093 (1964).
84. Id. at 1097.
85. 37 T.C. 973 (1962).
86. For a discussion of trust-adviser powers, see Note, Trust Ad-
visers, 78 IARv. L. REv. 1230 (1965).
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waste; these powers were not present in King.
The foregoing cases clearly indicate that State Street no
longer represents the law as to the extent to which the testa-
tor's retained management powers over property transferred
must be limited. However, the extent to which the courts have
retreated from the rigorous State Street position is less clear.
The Wurts, King, and Peters cases indicate that retention of the
following broad powers will not likely result in taxation: Powers
to invest and reinvest trust assets, to determine which charges
are against income and which against principal, to allocate ex-
traordinary income between income and principal, to act as trust
advisor in certain capacities, and to evaluate property for distri-
bution purposes. On the other hand, State Street has never been
overruled, and shows that if the powers retained are too nu-
merous or too extensive, inclusion may result. With this caveat,
it appears that fairly extensive management and administra-
tive powers may be retained, yet estate taxation be avoided
through application of the external standards doctrine.
D. ESTATE PLANNING USE FOR THE EXTERNAL STANDAnRs DoCTRINE
The external standards doctrine has potential application
to a wide spectrum of powers which the testator may wish to
retain over property he transfers during his life. The spectrum
extends from trivial powers, such as the power to change merely
mechanical details of the transfer in the trust instrument, to
more pervasive powers, such as the power to terminate the
trust. In determining whether the external standards doctrine
will successfully exclude property subject to a given retained
power, a number of factors must be considered.
First, the pervasiveness of the power itself must be noted,
without regard to any limitation on the power. For example, an
extensive power, such as a power of invasion of corpus, will
need an explicit and restrictive standard-"for the education of
the beneficiary"-for exclusion. On the other hand, a less per-
vasive power, such as the management power to reinvest earn-
ings in "legals," will not require this restrictive a standard.
If it is enforceable under state law, the standard is sufficient.
In weighing this factor, the estate planner should consider if
the power retained is consistent with the policy underlying the
external standards doctrine. If the retained powers over the
interest are limited sufficiently so as not to be equivalent to
holding the interest itself, the interest transferred will be ex-
cluded from the estate.
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A second factor to be considered is the total quantity of
power retained by the testator. This grouping-of-powers factor
was considered important by the court in State Street, and ap-
pears to have continued importance. Third, the estate planner
must investigate the precedent relevant to the particular power
and the particular standard in question, dealt with in the earlier
parts of this Note. However, because the external standards
doctrine is still a developing and possibly expanding concept,
the first two factors should be given equal consideration with
the third.
The doctrine of external standards can be of considerable
value to the estate planner. In applying the doctrine, the plan-
ner must analyze the various factors as discussed above, evaluate
the possible risks in light of the analysis, and balance the pos-
sible risk of inclusion against the benefit accruing to the client-
testator through the use of the external standard doctrine.
